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Facilitating the Detection of Strategically Manipulated Information:
A Field Test of Social Contract Theory
Stefano Grazioli
MSIS Department
The University of Texas at Austin
Abstract
Individuals and organizations often need to detect whether the information provided by business partners is
free from manipulations designed to favorably affect the behavior of the information recipients. The problem
of detecting such manipulations is ubiquitous in organizations, has often high stakes, and is generally difficult
to solve. A field experiment with 18 loan officers has tested two conditions derived from Social Contract
Theory and designed to facilitate successful detection. The results show that knowledge of the information
provider’s adversarial intentions and possible manipulations is a determinant of detection success.

Social Contract Theory
The recent diffusion of electronic commerce practices has increased the sensitivity of both researchers and practitioners to
the need to insure the identity of those involved in business communications and to protect the contents of the transmitted
information from third-party tampering. By comparison, not much attention is currently paid to the problem of detecting whether
information has been strategically manipulated by the sender for the purpose of favorably affecting the behavior of the recipients.
Examples of settings where information can be manipulated include insurance claims evaluation, loan approval, and financial
investment.
In general, detecting strategically manipulated information is quite difficult, even when the detectors are highly trained
professionals using sophisticated information technologies (e.g., Hoffman et al., 1997; Hansen et al., 1996; Ekman, 1995). The
study presented here draws from a well-tested theory in cognitive psychology to investigate the effects of knowing the intentions
and possible actions of an adversarial business partner on detection success.
Social Contract Theory (Cosmides and Tooby, 1992; 1989; 1985) has examined the determinants of success and failure at
detecting ‘cheaters’ in social contracts. A social contract is broadly defined as an interaction between two parties characterized
by a conflict of interest: one party is obligated to satisfy a requirement of some kind, usually at some cost, in order to receive
a benefit from the second party. Cheating is the opportunistic violation of a social contract and consists of taking the benefit
without satisfying the requirement. Social Contract Theory (SCT) has hypothesized the existence of ‘specialized’ cognitive
mechanisms that support the detection of violations of established social contracts. In particular, these mental mechanisms
include cognitive representations of the cost and benefit structure of the environment, the adversarial goals of the other party,
and the other party’s possible adversarial actions (see also Thagard, 1992; Dennett, 1987). Under conditions that activate these
detection mechanisms, detection success is greatly facilitated. In their absence, detection failure is likely.
A weak activating condition and a strong activating condition have been proposed in the SCT literature. The weak condition
states that triggering the specialized cognitive machinery depends on the perceived ‘presence’ of a motivated adversary
(Cosmides, 1985). The strong condition states that the successful detector needs to be ‘looking for’ opportunistic behavior,
which means to assume the ‘perspective’ of a party directly involved in a social contract and to recognize that the other party
has a ‘cheating option’ (Gigerenzer and Hug, 1992; Griggs, 1984; Yacanin and Tweney, 1982). The strong condition includes
the weak one because in order to be looking for opportunistic behavior in a social interaction one must be aware of its adversarial
nature.
The effects of the two conditions have been successfully tested in several series of laboratory experiments with naive
subjects. However, the Social Contract researchers have not attempted to apply their theory to realistically complex social
interactions, such as the business transactions that routinely occur in organizations. The field experiment described next extends
SCT to the detection of strategically manipulated financial information as a form of cheating detection and examines the effects
of the two conditions on the outcomes of a banking task.

Field Experiment
A sample of eighteen loan officers from a large national bank participated in the experiment as paid volunteers. The subjects
(eleven males and seven females) have spent on average 9.5 years a loan officer (std.dev. = 7.3). During the experiment each
loan officer performed three loan approval tasks plus one ‘warm-up’ task. Each task consisted of examining a loan application
packet and to assign a credit risk rating and a ‘quality of information’ rating to it. Credit risk (from 1 to 7) is the standard
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measure of creditworthiness used at the Bank. Quality of information measures the extent in which the subject believes that the
financial information provided by the company applying for a loan accurately reflects the company’s economic conditions
(Revsine, 1994; O’Glove and Sobel, 1987).
Each packet consists of a $5 million loan application form, the financial statements of the applying company (SEC filings),
and the output of a financial DSS (key ratios, reclassified cash flows, etc.). All packets describe real companies, minimally
disguised. Unknown to the subjects, management of these companies severely overstated their income. The manipulations in
the cases range from overstating inventory prices, to improperly capitalizing R&D costs, to creating ‘soft’ assets. The company
used in the warm-up task is a healthy company, who provided ‘clean,’ non-manipulated financial information.
Each subject performed the three tasks under three conditions (control, weak, and strong). Subjects in the control condition
received only the loan application packet. The control condition establishes a base-line against which to measure the effects of
the other two treatment conditions. Subjects in the weak activation condition received the packet and were informed that in some
of the cases they were reviewing, management had the goal of overstating net income and/or net assets for the purpose of
increasing the company’s chances to obtain credit. Subjects in the strong condition were given the same information, plus a list
of ten possible manipulations to achieve these goals (the ‘cheating options’ in SCT). Examples of the items in the list include:
‘shipping goods before a sale is finalized’, ‘depreciating or amortizing costs too slowly’, ‘failing to write off or overstating
worthless assets’, and ‘failing to disclose commitments and contingencies.’
The experiment features a 3x3 Latin square double cross-over design (Neter et al., 1991). This relatively sophisticated
design offers the advantage of controlling for 1) subject, 2) case, and 3) order of presentation effects, since it replicates three
times all possible orders of case administration (e.g., ABC, ACB, BAC...). In total, 54 loan approval tasks were observed (plus
18 warm-up tasks). Each subject participated in the experiment in individually scheduled meetings with the author, during
normal business hours, in his/her office. No time limits were imposed to the task.
Six hypotheses were tested. The first two hypotheses state that loan officers in the strong condition select higher credit risk
rating and lower information quality rating than loan officers in the control condition. The next two hypotheses state that loan
officers in the weak condition select higher credit risk rating and lower information quality rating than loan officers who do not.
The last two hypotheses compare the ratings rendered under the two conditions.

Results and discussion
The statistical analysis of the experimental data supports the strong activation hypotheses and rejects the weak hypotheses
and the comparison hypotheses for both dependent variables. The main effects of the treatment on credit risk and information
quality are both significant (p=0.004). More specifically, presenting subjects with information about possible management’s
goals and manipulations significantly increases their mean credit risk and significantly decreases perceived information quality,
and presenting subjects with information about management’s goals only does not (Tukey test - family alpha=0.01). In Social
Contract Theory terms, it is not enough for a detector to acknowledge the presence of motivated adversaries. One must also ‘look
for’ their ‘cheating options.’
The Theory explains the results of the experiment in terms of the constraints to the search for interpretive hypotheses.
Processing information about management’s possible goals and manipulations helps constraining the search for hypotheses that
interpret anomalies found in the information provided by management, which in turn facilitates successful detection of deception.
Processing only the goals insufficiently constraints the search for appropriate hypotheses and does not elicit success with equal
strength, if at all.
On average, subjects in the strong activation condition increased their assessed credit risk by 0.83 points when compared
to subjects in the control conditions. The mean credit risk moves from 4.46 (control condition) to 5.47 (strong activation
condition). This range is pragmatically meaningful because 5 is the Bank’s risk threshold that divides acceptable credit risk and
credit risk that needs to be managed (for instance by a higher interest rate, additional collateral, or insertion in a special watchlist). For comparison purposes, the average credit risk assigned to the clean, not manipulated case is 3.26 (p < 0.01).
The strong activation condition has also the effect of decreasing the mean ratings on information quality from 4.67 to 3.01
when compared to the control condition. The mean ratings obtained under these two conditions lie on opposite sides of the
midpoint of the information quality scale (1 = inaccurate and 7 = accurate information). The stronger treatment effect observed
for information quality is consistent with the nature of this dependent variable, arguably a more direct measure of a subject’s
detection of manipulated information than credit risk.
A possible objection to the design of this experiment is that the subjects increased their perceived risk assessment as an
artifact of the treatment, and not because they were in fact better able to detect manipulated information. Analysis of process
data gathered during the experiment (think-aloud protocols) shows that this is not the case: loan officers in the strong condition
were more able to specifically detect false or misleading statements present in the experimental materials than officers in the
control condition (Grazioli, 1997). A second limitation of the study is that it is not realistic to inform the subject that some of
the cases might have been manipulated. A companion experiment (Grazioli, 1997) has removed this limitation and produced
consistent results.
Overall, the consistency, significance and strength of the results attest that the experiment was successful. From a pragmatic
standpoint, the findings of this research can be used to improve the training of the professionals that are responsible for making
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organizational decisions based on information that may have been manipulated (e.g., Revsine, 1991, 1994), to inform the design
of systems that support the decisions of these professionals (e.g., Peters, 1990), as well as the design of transaction systems that
are currently vulnerable to manipulations of input information (e.g., Lucas, 1993). From a broader scientific standpoint, the work
presented her has extended SCT results previously obtained in carefully crafted laboratory experiments (Gigerenzer and Hug,
1992) to a realistically complex organizational task that routinely requires the detection of information that is misleading by
design.
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